Introduction
Valuation of nature in monetary terms is controversial and has often been criticized. One reason is that different disciplines express distinct ideas on the desirability of monetary valuation as an input for decision-making on environmental policy. In a recent paper, Kallis et al. (2013) introduce the main views of political ecology (PE) on monetary valuation of nature. The authors present a set of normative criteria aiming to support researchers and environmentalists in evaluating when to make use of monetary valuation methods for policy-making purposes and when not. The authors offer a practical guide based on answers to four yes/no questions conveying the normative criteria to be fulfilled or not. While we appreciate the idea to critically judge placing monetary values on nature, we identify two main problems with the way this issue has been dealt with in their article. Firstly, we believe that both the proposed criteria and selected examples are not very representative and relevant for judging the necessity and usefulness of valuation and thus can only be of limited help to researchers and practitioners.
Secondly, in much of their discussion Kallis et al. do not clearly and consistently separate between monetary valuation and pricing instruments (a subclass of environmental policy instruments). Although the central question raised in Kallis et al. is "when and how to value with money?", the guiding principles they provide are more suitable for assessing policy instruments than monetary valuation. While we acknowledge the fact that monetary valuation can convey information for the design of certain policy instruments (e.g., environmental taxes), the approach of Kallis et al. confuses rather than helps a good debate about the merits of monetary valuation. Moreover, if their aim is to propose how to value with money, one would expect a debate regarding theoretical and methodological shortcomings in deriving monetary values (whether using revealed or stated preference techniques) or regarding the application and use of these values (as in cost-benefit analysis, CBA). Both issues are, however, entirely missing from the article. We further will note that monetary valuation is approached in a much more critical way than other "valuation languages", by Kallis et al. as well as by ecological economics more broadly. Hereafter we provide detailed arguments to support these statements.
Irrelevance of the proposed criteria for assessing monetary valuation
In order to judge the suitability of monetary valuation, Kallis et al. propose four normative criteria, namely "environmental improvement"
1 , "equality", "value pluralism", and "accumulation by dispossession / neo-liberalism". While the former two are reminiscent of standard criteria for evaluating policy instruments suggested in textbooks on environmental economics -next to efficiency or cost-effectiveness -"value pluralism" and "accumulation by dispossession" seem to be mainly inspired by the PE literature. 
Criterion 1: Environmental improvement
The first criterion asks if monetary valuation will improve environmental conditions. It is fair to assume that anyone who engages in monetary valuation of environmental changes or policies aspires to improve environmental quality or protection. In practice, however, the person carrying out the valuation exercise is unlikely to know with certainty in advance the outcome of the decision process for which the monetary values (may) serve(s) as an input in the future. It is important to realize that issues other than valuation are much more important for judging the effectiveness of policies. One example is rebound of well-intended strategies or policies, which means that all kinds of indirect, often unforeseen results lower the direct, intended effect of a policy. This has generated much literature, which suggests that pricing may be the best solution to minimizing rebound leakages (van den Bergh, 2011) . Another example is a behavioural issue that has received some attention in recent years, namely crowding-out of intrinsic motivations due to pricing or other policy instruments (e.g., Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy and Rusticchini, 2000) . The possibility of crowding-out does not mean, however, that one should immediately reject the respective instrument. Instead, the net effect of incentives through regulation and crowding-out should be compared with the effects that result in case no regulation or other policy instruments are implemented. Pricing is still likely to perform well as the basic price incentive effect tends to dominate the crowding-out-of-motivation effect (Fehr and Falk, 2002) .
Criterion 2: Equality
The second criterion relates to the issue of equality. Like the previous criterion, this one is more appropriate to judge or steer policy design rather than monetary valuation.
A basic question here is whether valuation pays insufficient attention to equality. We think that it is not correct to suggest that this is generally the case. (re)distribution effects are not a unique or distinctive feature of regulation by prices; all serious, effective environmental regulation will involve distributional effects.
Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to ask of environmental valuation (as well as of environmental policy), which is intended to help solving environmental problems in the first place, to also "reduce inequalities and redistributive power" (Kallis et al., p.100) . For environmental policy evaluation it would be fair to require that inequality is not increased.
Evidently, environmental policy cannot be expected to circumvent or solve all existing inequalities. However, in some cases environmental policies can contribute to reducing inequality. For example, given that many poor people in the world tend to live in climate riskprone areas, serious climate policy would mean avoiding increased inequality due to climate change.
Finally, given that monetary value estimates often serve as inputs to a CBA of a policy instrument or scenario which make (implicit) assumptions about how to address distribution of outcomes, this type of application deserves particular attention. It was not discussed by Kallis et al., which we feel is an omission. Addressing CBA in this context of "valuation for policy" allows for a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between monetary values, policy and equity or fairness. CBA separates efficiency from equity, which is a simplification since strictly seen distribution affects individual values and utilities (through relative income/welfare, status seeking, inequity aversion, etc.), and thus efficiency. This suggests that CBA should be treated with care in the context of considerable income inequality. One can, nevertheless, account for the fact that the marginal utility of money is falling with income by applying distributional weights in CBA -implying a lower weight for richer people or regions. This procedure was followed, for example, in the Stern Review on evaluating the net benefits of climate policy (Stern, 2007) .
All in all, we would judge monetary valuation more positively in the context of addressing inequality concerns. The reason is that valuation can be combined with distributional weights, and moreover can contribute to obtaining insight into the distribution of costs and benefits, as well as the variation in individual perceptions of such a distribution. In other words, monetary valuation might help to operationalize equity concerns and indicators. This means a more complete and balanced perspective than Kallis et al.
Criterion 3: Value pluralism
The third criterion suggests that monetary valuation is likely to suppress other languages of valuation and value-articulating institutions. The crucial issue here is value pluralism and the desirability of ensuring multiple languages of valuation. We recognize the importance of alternative values, which may be appropriate and meaningful in particular contexts. However, we believe that one should be equally critical of other, non-monetary valuation approaches, recognizing that these so far have not offered very specific information or surprising insights to environmental policy making, and often do not provide opportunities for robust quantification are not able to answer these questions with a clear "yes". Therefore, we are puzzled that the authors (and many others in ecological economics) are so critical of monetary valuation and that they suggest there is an (urgent) need to replace it with other valuation approaches. Finally, one can wonder whether the name "valuation" for such things as "human/territorial rights" is really useful and necessary. Isn't the term "rights" clear enough in itself? "Valuation" anyway conveys the idea of a continuous scale, while "rights" has more the character of a binary variable (i.e.
you either do or do not have a right). From this perspective, "valuation" is a bit of a misnomer.
So far most writers in ecological economics seem to have been more critical of monetary valuation than of its alternatives. We feel it would be good to be equally critical of other "valuation languages". In this sense, our discussion offers a starting point for further deliberation.
Criterion 4: Accumulation by dispossession / neo-liberalism
There are various problems associated with the fourth criterion. It is not only very ad hoc and subjective, but also ambiguous in its meaning. Furthermore, is it really good science to suggest that "neo-liberalism" is generally bad (or good, for that matter)? Should science really use such a politically laden concept, on which very distinct political viewpoints exists, to serve as a criterion for evaluating methods?
What precisely counts as "an enclosure of the commons" or a process of "accumulation by dispossession" driven by neo-liberalism is debatable. It is not clear where to draw the boundary -pricing the environment (e.g., through taxes), or for that matter any other policy instrument, can be defended as anti neo-liberal as it tries to correct for free markets and market prices that do not reflect environmental externalities (unintended social costs). The result is a market strongly regulated by environmental policy measures, which is a far cry from neo-liberalism. 3 One can further wonder whether a valuation study that considers the option of a property right conveys a "neo-liberal" or "accumulation by dispossession" viewpoint. The outcome of the study may well be that respondents attach a low value to it or prefer another instrument if there are multiple instruments offered, in which case the "dispossession" would receive little support.
This criterion is associated with the idea that "commodification" of environmental resources and processes is generally bad. Being critical of this criterion does not mean we support the idea that "expansion of markets", "free markets" or "free trade" is generally good.
But the view expressed by Kallis et al. reflects more an ideological position than a carefully argued criterion that can count on broad support.
Even though there is no perfectly objective policy analysis (Bromley, 1990) , we think that more general criteria, with outcomes that are as objective as possible, need to be used to inform environmental policy making. Criteria like efficiency (welfare-enhancing, which includes cost-effectiveness as a special case), equity and environmental effectiveness (and several others -see Russell and Powell, 1999) are widely supported precisely because they are the least subjective among a wider set of possible policy criteria. No general ideological position for or against markets is required. The fact that free markets (can) generate externalities does not mean that regulated markets and markets for pollution permits, which are quite different markets, are to be judged negatively. Notably, if a permit market is assessed as effective, efficient and equitable, then we do not see why one should be against it. If one can show for particular cases that on the basis of these criteria a price-or market-based policy does not work well then such a policy should not be implemented and the performance of alternative policy approaches on these criteria should be examined to see if they can do a better job.
3 Pricing the environment does not require perfectly correct pricing based on perfect monetary valuation of externalities. Regulators can, through trial-and-error, experiment with prices (taxes) until targeted problems are controlled. This would then approximate the theoretically correct prices. Illustrative of this is that many payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes have been designed without any supporting monetary valuation studies, or analysis of opportunity costs of land. Instead, incentives have been often negotiated, sometimes involving participation of different stakeholders Kosoy et al., 2008) . Such a pragmatic approach can circumvent difficult discussions about, as well as time-consuming and costly techniques to calculate, the correct prices -witness the debate about the social cost of carbon (van den Bergh, 2010).
Discarding the relevance of "neo-liberal" approaches, supposedly meaning pricing and market instruments, to achieve efficiency or cost-effectiveness (e.g., of meeting a certain emission target) is easy if the efficiency gains are small and uncertain. However, if one finds that with one instrument the cost of reaching an environmental target can be reduced by more than, for example, 50% compared to using other instruments, could one honestly say that this is not relevant information (i.e. that cost-effectiveness is not a relevant criterion)? We seriously doubt it. A "cheaper solution" increases political feasibility, among others, as there is more money left to distribute. Of course, this does not mean one has to immediately opt for the most efficient/cost-effective instrument. But it is unavoidable that such information plays a role in selecting policy instruments. We do not want to deny that pricing of environmental goods or services previously not under a pricing regime could in certain cases be interpreted as bringing these within the realm of economic commodities. But here one has to be precise. For example, environmental taxation is a form of pricing that does not involve creating a new market or require market exchange as is the case with tradable permits or certain -but not all -PES schemes. Many PES schemes in developing countries involve subsidies, which means that no actual market exchange is involved (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2010) . Furthermore, such subsidies are related neither to the economic value of ecosystem services nor to their provision levels (Kroeger, 2013) . Tradable permits, on the other hand, are usually about pollution, which is not the same as nature or the environment. In fact, this instrument is aimed at avoiding (too much) pollution from entering into the environment or damaging nature. So while some PES (e.g., carbon offsets from forests) can be seen as an example of commodification of nature or the environment, this is less evident for tradable pollution permits and not true for taxation. One should therefore be careful and avoid generalizations about "commodification" of nature/environment.
Shortcomings of the illustrative examples
The authors use five real-world examples to demonstrate how the four criteria can be applied to assess the desirability of monetary valuation. There are at least three problems associated with these examples: (1) compare the benefits (avoided damages) and costs of pollution abatement, to inform environmental accounting at national, regional, municipal or firm (organization) levels, to undertake liability assessments (e.g., for legal court cases), and to provide information about non-market or public good effects (e.g., of climate change) for use in environmental CBA (Hanley and Spash, 1993; Bateman et al., 2002) . Numerous publications, also in this journal, illustrate these various uses of monetary valuation. We do not suggest that the authors need to be exhaustive and cover all practical examples of monetary valuation, but we do believe that including the most common applications would provide much stronger and more objective case for illustrating the use of the criteria and arguing the (ir)relevance of monetary valuation.
It is rather surprising that the authors claim water pricing to not, or at best possibly, improve environmental conditions. For there is a broad literature that clearly illustrates the positive effects of pricing on diminishing water demand (e.g., Olmstead and Stavins, 2009; Grafton et al., 2011) , which the authors omit. It is also questionable that Kallis et al. rate markets for ecosystem services with a clear "no" in terms of environmental effectiveness while public PES schemes are rated with a clear "yes". Conclusions about the environmental (in)effectiveness of economic policy instruments for biodiversity conservation are very much premature given that robust evaluations of economic conservation instruments continue to be rare (Miteva et al., 2012; Pattanayak et al., 2010) . In contrast to studies mentioned by Kallis et al., there is evidence that market-based schemes for ecosystem services can induce the expected conservation outcomes (e.g., Wendland et al., 2010; Hedge and Bull, 2011) , while there is proof of both positive and negative environmental performance of public PES (Scullion et al., 2011; Arriagada et al., 2012) . In any case, this issue can only be settled by a survey of all representative studies, not by selectively presenting evidence. There is agreement in the literature that better designed and targeted PES can function as environmentally effective instruments in the right settings (e.g., Wünscher et al., 2008; Wunder, 2013) .
Next, Kallis et al. assess distributional effects for given examples. Although economic policy instruments are typically focused on achieving an efficient allocation of natural resources, they can also be used to promote equity objectives (Rogers et al., 2002; OECD, 2013) . Alternatively, additional instruments can be introduced with the aim of improving equality (Sterner, 2003; EEA, 2006; OECD, 2013) . However, the authors entirely neglect this issue and the relevant literature. For example, they assume that full-cost (water) pricing is socially regressive even though this does not have to be necessarily the case if pricing is designed well (Rogers et al., 2002; OECD, 2013) , for example, if full-cost pricing is coupled with increasing block pricing (Barberán and Arbués, 2009) . Once again, the treatment confuses policy instruments and monetary valuation by not acknowledging that distributional consequences are related to the design of the policy instrument and not to monetary valuation itself. In fact, on the basis of monetary valuation studies one could in principle decide about the distribution of costs, that is, who can and is willing to pay more or less for a certain environmental policy or project.
Finally, a serious omission in the article, which claims to offer a critical discussion of valuation, is that the important distinction between revealed and stated preferences approaches does not receive any attention. Surprisingly, the terms are not even mentioned. It should be recognized that one cannot generalize too much about monetary valuation as each valuation approach has its specific advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, the two approaches are to some extent complementary. Assessing revealed preferences is important as they show the fundamentals that have driven decisions and trends in the past. An important advantage of stated preference techniques is that they can explore hypothetical issues that are not reflected in historical data, which invites their application to future, planned policies and expected or potential environmental changes. This approach to valuation can be seen as democratic, especially if income effects are accounted for. In fact, many stated valuation techniques take the form of a referendum, something which many critics of monetary valuation embrace enthusiastically as a sign of real democracy and freedom. Adding a monetary dimension to a referendum format just means that one can measure preferences in a more subtle way -it is like asking how strong your preferences for a certain thing or change are. One can be more critical of revealed preference studies in the context of extreme income inequality when they do not include income information, so that the findings are very much influenced by the income distribution without one being able to correct for it. Nevertheless, revealed preference valuation increasingly relies on controlled field experiments which allow adding information on incomes of respondents (e.g., Löschel and Vogt, 2013; Jack et al., 2008) .
Towards a fair and constructive criticism of monetary valuation and other "valuation languages"
We think it is good to be critical of monetary valuation. But one has to focus on real weaknesses then. Notably the assumption of rational behavior (consumers maximizing utility) is a serious weakness and means that any assessed values are an approximation at best. This has perhaps received too little attention so far in methodological progress of valuation techniques.
Nevertheless, studies to compare values between methods, and experiments to examine preference stability and formation, have provided much insight into the robustness of the valuation results under various conditions (Ariely et al., 2003; DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; List, 2003; Braga and Starmer, 2005; Holmes and Boyle, 2005; Brouwer et al., 2010 policy instruments than monetary valuation (but we don't think they are all needed, especially the fourth one). We agree with the authors that the goal of "an egalitarian socio-ecological transition" means giving more attention to distributional impacts -as well as barriers (vested interests). But this does not justify being so critical of monetary valuation and pricing without proper evidence that it necessarily performs badly on equity (and environmental effectiveness).
We would argue that this depends on many additional factors, which suggests that one should avoid generalizations. Instead, the authors just stress arguably negative consequences, suggesting that monetary valuation has enhanced, or will enhance, "accumulation by dispossession", "privatization, enclosure and the institution of private property rights" and "free market". These are very big claims, while the article does not offer any convincing empirical evidence for them. On the other hand, the authors do not provide any guarantees that more effective environmental policies will result from the suggested PE approach.
Our first and main task as environmental scientists is to assist in the design and implementation of effective policies and strategies to address the diversity of environmental problems. In our view, a modest, constructive approach would be to provide clear insight about the conditions under which monetary valuation and pricing instruments function well and can help policy making, rather than being generally skeptical about them. We are strongly in favour of value pluralism. But we have the impression that so far most writers in ecological economics have been much more critical of monetary valuation than of its alternatives. It would be good to be equally critical of other "valuation languages", rather than pay lip service to these. As noted in the discussion of criterion 3 ("value pluralism") in Section 2, there are various reasons to be critical of these. In this sense, our discussion offers a starting point for further deliberation about the comparative performance of different valuation languages. In fact, this type of research is at the heart of ecological economics.
